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NEGLIGENCE OF THE PHYSICALLY INFIRM
G. B. WEISIGER*

Tort liability as related to physical defects has been a subject of
litigation in a considerable number of cases. Most of the situations involve negligence and the formulas used by the courts with reference to
the standard of conduct. The opinions disclose a certain amount of
disagreement if not confusion as to the test to be applied in instructing
juries or in drawing the inference of negligence as a matter of law.
Serious physical incapacity in the form of blindness, deafness, lack of
limbs and in other respects exists to such an extent as to make it appear
desirable to give some consideration to the rules of negligence related to
this condition. It is proposed to discuss this subject with reference to
contributory fault of persons physically defective and to the standard of
conduct required of such persons as it affects the interests of others.
One difficulty that underlies the whole matter is the failure to agree
on what negligence is. Salmond's' view emphasizes the mens rea and
suggests a subjective approach. On the other hand, writers2 and courts
generally deal with the situation largely from the objective point of
view. Alderson 3 defined negligence as consisting of an act or failure to
act, in other words in terms of conduct. But the conduct if it is not
to be negligent must be that of the reasonable man. To identify the
reasonable man, the standard man, there must be agreement on his
qualities, mental, physical and moral. In comparing the actor's conduct
with that of the reasonable man, the judge or jury assumes the actor's
qualities must be identical with the reasonable man's whether they are
or not. This would seem to be a method as objective as Alderson's
definition would permit. This procedure depends on an external test
of the actor's behavior and is objective with reference to his actual qualities. If, however, some attribute of the actor is considered to account
for a variance between his conduct and the external standard, to that
extent the approach is subjective.
*LL.B., Professor of Law, University of Illinois. The author desires to
acknowledge the valued assistance of John E. Cribbett, Student Research Assistant in Legal Medicine, College of Law, University of Illinois, in collecting the
legal authorities.
1 SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (9th ed. 1937) §140.
'Terry, Negligence (1915) 29 HARv. L. REv. 40. See especially, Edgerton,
Negligence, Inadvertence and Indifference; The Relation of Mental States to Nvegligence (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 849.
'Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Exch. 781 (1856).
"Negligence
is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those con-

siderations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do."
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Under the objective standard conduct speaks for itself. If what the
actor does or appears to do seems unreasonably dangerous as viewed
externally, there is negligence. If a car on a crowded street swerves from
one side to the other surely the driver must be negligent according to
this test. Yet, if some unexpected ailment seized the driver resulting in
loss of his consciousness, he is not liable for the death of a pedestrian
in the path of his car. 4 Likewise, if a driver of a car suddenly and
unexpectedly loses muscular control, no liability attaches for harm arising from his conduct. 5 In both these situations an entirely objective
consideration would result in liability. By taking account of the physical incapacity, a subjective factor, the result is different.
The method of ignoring the actor's qualities and proceeding objectively to determine liability has the merit of simplicity and convenience.0 However, the attempt to maintain one standard and at the same
time make allowance for attributes of the actor in which he varies from
the normal man, has succeeded in confusing juries and, it may be suspected, the courts as well.
When the concept of negligence gained recognition in the law it is
not strange that the standard sought was largely objective. With reference to infinite varieties of factual situations a formula of measurement had to be adopted. In the early law of absolute liability nothing
more was required to make the defendant liable than that his act resulted
in plaintiff's damage. "For what he did unwittingly he repented wittingly." Under this principle there was no thought of such notions as
negligence, objective or subjective, negligence as a term of relation or
the so-called rules of proximate cause. The standard of liability required only a causal connection between act and harm and afforded little
difficulty in appication. When the fault requirement was first admitted
courts were not at all certain as to how far it should invade the older
doctrine. Such expressions as "utterly without fault" and "unavoidable
accident" and "that he could not have acted in any other way" to be
found in this period of transition suggest standards differing little from
acting at peril. When Alderson's definition was announced the courts
through experience were inclined to apply it objectively. The court or
jury as identified with the reasonable man was to determine whether the
actor's conduct, without reference to any unusual quality of the actor,
presented the appearance of unreasonable risk. In Vaughan v. Men'Slattery v. Haley, 3 Dominion L. R. 156, 25 Ont. L. R. 95 (1923).
* Cohen v. Petty, 65 Fed. (2d) 820 (1933).
* Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N. H. 501, 511, 153 AUt. 457, 463, 73 A. L. R.

1266, 1275 (1931).
"The understanding of this court that the general standard
of care governing the conduct of adults namely, reasonable care under all the

circumstances applies as well to minors as adults and that infancy and want of
experience of the latter are merely evidential factors to be weighed with the other
circumstances, is made plain in Goodall v. York, 74 N. H. 454.. . "
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love,7 the court held it immaterial that the defendant acted bona fide
and according to his best judgment. In The Gerntnic8 it was held that
if the defendant acted as his judgment approved, even though he were
an expert, this was not sufficient to avoid liability. It may be admitted
that these two decisions are correct and that the judgment factor should
be measured externally. However, the language of both is so comprehensive toward objectivity that in many decisions, the courts attempt
to apply the same external standard to all the qualities which according
to that standard are presumed to be found in the normal person. While
in some cases the actor is subjectively considered as to such a quality
as physical incapacity, the tendency is to so relate these differences from
the norm to the objective test that the overall appearance of his behavior must meet the external standard as applied to the normal man.
Such a fondness for one method of deciding cases and the endeavor -to
equate similar and dissimilar situations has led to misunderstanding.
The transition from absolute liability to a basis of fault was not accomplished in a day or by the decision of one case. Or rather it may be
said the concept of fault changes with the accumulation of experience,
progress made in the methods of proof, and a better understanding of
those characteristics of an individual that relate to fault. As the law.
of crimes has evolved with greater emphasis on the individual capacity
of the accused, so in negligence a greater variation from the requirement of one external standard of conduct may be expected with more
consideration for the personal equation of the actor than is found in the
earlier cases.
The Restatement of Torts after defining negligence in terms of
conduct 9 particularizes in Section 289 as follows:
"The actor should recognize that his conduct involves a risk of
causing an invasion of another's interest, if a person,
(a) possessing such perception of the surrounding circumstances
as a reasonable man would have, or such superior perception
as the actor himself has, and
(b) possessing such knowledge of other pertinent matters as a
7 3 Bing. N. C. 468 (1837) in which Tindal, C. J., says: "Instead, therefore,
of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of
each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases
a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would observe."
8 196 U. S. 589, 596, 25 Sup. Ct. 317 (1904). Holmes, J., says: "The standard
of conduct, whether left to the jury or laid down by the court, is an external
standard, and takes no account of the personal equation of the man concerned."
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS §282: "Negligence is any conduct except conduct recklessly disregardful of the interests of others which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.'
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reasonable man would have, or such superior knowledge as
the actor himself has, and
(c) correlating such perception and knowledge with reasonable
intelligence and judgment would infer that the act creates an
appreciable chance of causing such invasion."
It is to be observed in this statement that the actor's qualities of
perception and knowledge must be at least equal to those of the reasonable man, and that he must use the intelligence of the reasonable man
and more if he has it'0 with reasonable judgment." In only the judgment factor is the standard entirely objective. In comment e 12 on this
section with reference to perception it is stated:
"The qualities which a reasonable man possesses and which therefore the actor must exercise to obtain a perception of the surrounding circumstances are:
"1. Physical capacity to obtain sense impressions."
In comment h'3 it is explained:
"Children and abnormal persons: Insofar as concerns the physical
capacity to perceive the circumstances surrounding the actor, allowance is made for physical infirmities if they are substantial and
capable of reasonably certain proof and, like blindness and deafness, deprive the actor of his physical capacity to perceive facts
readily perceptible to the normal man. If the actor knows that
he is physically inferior in any particular, he is required to use
his remaining faculties with greater diligence. Children of tender
years are judged by a different standard of perception, knowledge
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §289, comment o.: "Unless the actor is a child of tender
years or possibly unless he is insane, as to which see sec. 283, comment e and
caveat, no such allowance is made for his inferiority of intelligence as is made
for a substantial and clearly provable physical inferiority which prevents him
from obtaining a normal perception of his surroundings. He must exercise, at
the least, the intelligence of a reasonable man and must also exercise such superior
intelligence as he may possess. As in all cases where the reasonable man is the
standard to which the actor's personality must conform, the minimum of intelligence which he must possess and exercise is that which is customarily regarded
as requisite for the protection of himself and others, rather than that which the
average man customarily exercises, although in the majority of cases the two are
(see comment g)."
identical,
1
" RESTATEMENT, TORTS §291, comment c.: "In determining whether the actor
should realize the unreasonable character of a known or recognizable isk, the
judgment of the actor, unless he be a child or insane person, must conform to
the standard of a reasonable man, neither more nor less. He is not excused because he is peculiarly inconsiderate of others or reckless of his own safety nor is
he negligent if his moral or social conscience is so sensitive that he regards as
improper, conduct which a reasonable man would regard as proper. In this respect the problem differs somewhat from that of determining whethet the actor
should recognize the risk which his 'conduct involves and the magnitude thereof,
in which allowance is made for certain physical infirmities and in which the
actor
12 is required to utilize such superior qualities as he may possess."
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §289, comment e.
13
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §289, comment h.
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and intelligent correlation from that of the reasonable man (as to
insane persons see caveat e thereto). With these exceptions, the
actor must exercise such attention, intelligence, and memory as are
customarily regarded at the time and in the community as requisite for the protection of the interests of the actor and others. But
this is merely the minimum requirement. If the actor possesses
superior powers of perception of the circumstances surrounding
him, he is required to have a more perfect realization of the risk
which his conduct involves."
In comment e it is said that the actor must have the same physical
capacity to obtain sense impressions as the reasonable man. In comment h allowance is made for substantial physical infirmities and, if the
actors knows of them, he must use his remaining faculties with greater
diligence. This could mean that the same external standard is to be
applied to the physically defective as to the normal man if, for example,
what is lacking in sight must be made up in hearing. Conceivably, if
the hearing of a blind man is so acutely developed as to more than compensate for loss of sight he could be held to a standard higher than
is objectively used for the normal man. That a different standard is
not contemplated for the adult with physical incapacity is implied from
the language which follows as to children: "Children of tender years
are judged by a different standard of perception,'4 knowledge and intelligent correlation from that of the reasonable man." An illustration
that follows this comment suggests that a blind man is not required to
meet the objective standard:
"A, a blind man is walking down a sidewalk in which there is a
depression coated with ice. A normal man would see the depression and avoid it. A, being blind, is not negligent in walking
into it."1"5

From this illustration it is clear that the standard is subjective with
reference to the blindness. However attentive the actor may have been
in the use of the other senses and capacities they could not under these
circumstances compensate for the lack of sight. Objectively, then, as this
illustration indicates, a blind man's act is measured by a standard different from that used for the normal man.
Professor Seavey observes :'6
"Some cases in dealing with defective persons have said that they
must use 'a greater imount of care' to make up for this defect.
'Italics supplied.
, RESTATEMENT, TORTS §289, Illustration 5.
18 Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective (1927)
14, note 14.

41 HARv. L. REv. at p.
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Whether or not this is true, it is clear that a blind man is not
required to act as does one who can see, but is expected to act as
blind persons act, so that conduct which would be negligent in
one who can see may not be negligent in a blind man and vice
versa."
Prosser, discussing physical attributes makes this comment :17
"It is sometimes said that a blind man must use a greater degree
of care than one who can see, but this means nothing more than
that he must take the precautions the ordinary reasonable man
would take if he were blind. In theory the standard remains the
same, but it is sufficiently flexible to take his physical defects into
account."
If this means the standard for normal men remains the same when
applied to blind men it seems to conflict with the preceding statement
which would require the care of reasonable blind men. It -may be that
under certain circumstances the conduct, objectively considered, that is
required of a blind man might be the same as that required of the normal man due to the greater use of the blind man's other faculties which
it is reasonable to expect, or due to the blind man's particular undertaking, but this would be a coincidence. In theory, it appears, the standards are distinctly different.
It is generally admitted that the standard for adults is not the stand.ard for children.1 8 Obviously children cannot be expected to have the
knowledge, intelligence or judgment of adults. The courts usually use
the formula of like age, intelligence and experience. If children act as
children of like age, intelligence and experience are reasonably expected
to act, nothing more is required. The age factor places children in a
separate class not because age is important in itself but because it has
a bearing on the other qualities, mental and physical, that are essential
in the reasonable adult. The child's age gives some indication as to
what can be expected in physical ability, knowledge and judgment.
These qualities are considered objectively and also subjectively as to
what intelligence and experience the child in question possesses. A child
of fourteen might be shown to have such attributes as reasonably to
require of him the conduct of the reasonable adult. However, he is
entitled to be dealt with subjectively as to the ability he has and then
objectively as to the class of children to which he belongs by virtue of
his individual qualities. In other words, his conduct must be reasonable
for one of his class, a child of like age, intelligence and experience.
Whereas the age of a child differentiates him from the adult by reTORTS §36.
Cf. Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N. H. 501, 153 Atl. 457 (1931).

PRossmR,
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quiring a subjective consideration of those qualities deemed essential in
normal conduct, the proof of a physical defect of an adult at once places
him in a separate class as to one of these qualities such as perception.
It may be assumed the blind man should have ordinary knowledge, intelligence and judgment, and, in some situations, due to lack of perception with reference to sight, greater than normal ability in other
perceptive qualities. Whether this greater use of the other capacities
should compensate for the lack of visual perception, depends on the
nature of the surrounding circumstances. If it should make up for the
defect, then the external standard for normal adults would be applicable.
But in some cases compensating for the defect is impossible and cannot
reasonably be expected. To say that allowance should be made for a
physical defect and other capacities used more diligently suggests the
standard for normal men must be met or possibly something more. At
any rate, the statement is ambiguous and has been confusing. 9 To
deal with the physically defective as a class avoids this difficulty. To
require the conduct that can be reasonably expected under the circumstances of a person so incapacitated can be applied in all situations. If
the surroundings are such that greater diligence compensates for the
defect and the standard for normal men is met, that is coincidental. If
the surroundings require something less, as is frequently the case, then
the infirm adult is excused when he acts as a reasonable man of his class.
If the child cannot be expected to act as an adult, neither can the
physically defective adult, be expected to act as a normal adult. The
blind man is no more responsible for his blindness than the child for
his age.
TESTS APPLIED TO CONTRIBUTORY FAULT

The standard of conduct for the physically defective has been considered by the courts most frequently on the issue of contributory negligence. On appeal two types of questions are usually considered: error
in the trial court's instructions and whether on the evidence the finding
by the jury can be supported. Evidence of the plaintiff's incapacity may
come in on either side. At times judges have seemed perplexed that a
plaintiff would rely on his defective condition, implying that if any such
condition exists, the plaintiff would do better to conceal it. According
to this view, the plaintiff starts out with two strikes against him in the
proof of contributory fault. In Kaiser v. Hahn Bros.2 0 the plaintiff,
due to defective vision from recent illness, wore colored glasses as she
walked along the sidewalk. She stumbled over two skids that extended
about five inches high across the walk. An instruction on contributory
10 See Notes, 14 L. R. A. (l.s.) 648 and 41 L. R. A. (N.s) 193.
.' 126 Iowa 561, 102 N. W. 504 (1905).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

negligence called attention to the weakness of the plaintiff's eyes, the
effect the glasses might have had and "all facts and circumstances which
the evidence tended to prove." Judgment for plaintiff was reversed, the
court saying:
"It is true that the jury was fully instructed that it was the
duty of the plaintiff to act as an ordinary prudent person would
21
act under the circumstances but in view of the apparent reliance
placed by plaintiff on the defective condition of her eyes and the
wearing of colored glasses as an excuse for not observing the
obstruction in the walk, we think defendants were entitled to an
instruction such as that asked to the effect that, under such cir'22
cumstances, plaintiff was bound to use greater care and caution.
What standard the court expected the plaintiff to meet is not clear.
When it speaks of "The apparent reliance placed by the plaintiff on the
defective condition of her eyes," it appears that the court demands the
conduct of a person with normal vision or possibly something more. If
the court meant to use the standard for normal persons it seems pertinent to inquire why any evidence of the condition of the eyes should
be considered. If the result is the same irrespective of this subjective
factor, it would seem to have no bearing on the issue involved. If the
standard for normal persons is to be used, why all this difficulty in trying to balance the defect against the greater prudence and caution? The
expression apparent reliance leads one to suspect that the court might
exact a higher external standard of the person with bad eyes than one
with normal vision. Such an attempt to work the subjective element
into a rule applicable to all adults is misleading, and under the circumstances of this case it appears to be unwarranted.
In T. P. & W. Ry. Co. v. Hammett,23 plaintiff, a man 82 years of
age, afflicted with deafness, was struck by defendant's train which was
being backed over a crossing.

The trial court refused to give defend-

ant's requested instruction to the jury, as follows:
"... By due care for his own safety is meant that the law required him to exercise the degree of care that a reasonably prudent
person in possession of the ordinary senses and capacities would

have exercised under the facts and 'circumstances in evidence. If
21 See Candee v. K. C. & I. R. R.,
22 Kaiser v. Hahn Bros., 126 Iowa

130 Mo. 142, 31 S. W. 1029 (1895).
at 564 says: "The instruction asked was not
open to the objection that it required more than ordinary care of the plaintiff
under the circumstances. It correctly stated the rule recognized in Hill v. Glenwood, supra, that although the degree of care required of a person with defective
eyesight is the same as required of other persons, that is, ordinary care under the
circumstances-yet ordinary care on the part of a person with defective eyesight
involves greater prudence and caution than is required to constitute ordinary care
on the part of a person having full possession of his faculties."
23 220 Ill. 9, 77 N. E. 72 (1906).
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you believe he was old and hard of hearing yet that did not excuse
him from the duty to exercise the full degree of care as required
above, and the law is that any defect in hearing not only did not
excuse him from the exercise of care, but it required of him the
greater use of his other senses to discover whether a car was
approaching."
Instead the trial court gave this instruction:
"You are instructed that if you believe the plaintiff was old or his
hearing defective, yet that would not excuse him from the obligation to exercise due care. He was bound "toexercise that degree of
care that an ordinary prudent person whose hearing was so defective should have exercised under the circumstances shown in
24
evidence."
On appeal, judgment for plaintiff was reversed on the ground that
the charge requested was right and the charge given was erroneous.
The court said the evidence was close, the issues sharply drawn and the
instruction given was likely to mislead the jury and justify it in concluding that a deaf person is not required to hear, because that is impossible, and that to the extent of deafness, the degree of care required
of such person is lessened.
The Supreme Court of Illinois thus distinctly refused to recognize
the deaf plaintiff as a member of a class separate from normal persons
and it required of the deaf man compliance with the objective standard
as applied to normal persons. However, the trial judge's charge seems
to be entirely correct as it conforms to the prevalent assumption that
persons are not required to lock themselves in and avoid all the risks of
existence merely because of physical incapacity. This assumption is
expressed by the Iowa court 25 as follows:
"Sidewalks are made for the use of the lame, the halt, and the
blind, as well as for persons in the full possession of their faculties.
The standard of care owing to them is not, ordinarily, increased
by reason of defects of sight or of hearing, but these defects do
not of themselves prevent one possessed thereof from going onto
the public street."
2 Id. at 22, the court said: "The degree or kind of care required to be used
must be the same in the case of all adult persons in possession of their natural
faculties-that is, that it shall be reasonable and ordinary care. It cannot rest
on a sliding scale depending upon the acuteness of or defects in the senses of
sight, hearing or feeling. When one places himself in a position requiring the
exercise of care for his own safety, and is conscious that one of his senses designed by nature for his protection is dulled by age, disease or from some other

cause, he must be more vigilant in the use of the remaining senses to supply the

defect and protect himself."

" Yeager v. Inc. Town of Spirit Lake, 115 Iowa 593, 597, 88 N. W. 1095

(1902).
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In accord with the view that a blind man should be required to act
only as would a reasonable man so afflicted, is the case of Sleeper v.
SandoWn. 26

Here the plaintiff, a man totally blind, fell off a bridge due

to the neglect of the defendant town to replace a railing at the side of
the bridge. It was admitted that defendant was negligent in not replacing the railing. The trial.court refused the defendant's request for
a charge to the-jury that the plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law
since it would clearly be negligent for persons in general, possessing
the sense of vision, to walk off such a bridge in the daytime. On appeal, judgment for plaintiff was affirmed, the court saying:
"Although blindness in itself is not negligence, still in judging of
the conduct of a blind man, his unfortunate disability must be
considered, and he must doubtless be held to govern his conduct
with a reasonable regard to his situation in that respect."
In Neff v. Wellesley27 plaintiff, blind and lame, was struck by a
team of horses as he tried to cross a street. Defendant, driver of the
horses, did not know that plaintiff was blind. On appeal, the court in
affirming judgment for plaintiff, approved an instruction which read in
part:
"A blind man has a right to walk the streets, walk anywhere
where a person with full sight has a right to walk. A person wh
cannot hear has the same right to walk anywhere. A lame person
has a right to walk anywhere. But in view of the incapacities for
taking care of himself which a blind man has, and of which he
must be conscious, the exercise of ordinary prudence and caution
would require him to conduct his care with reference to his inability to see. And if there was an inability to hear, so that a
man could not take warning by the hearing of what was about
him, or likely to put him in jeopardy, his wariness in view of his
infirmity of hearing would be nothing more than the ordinary prudence and caution of a man who cannot take care of himself by
28

listening."

In Weinstein v. Wheeler2" the plaintiff, a blind boy, in attempting to
cross a street was struck by defendant's car. Defendant drove on the
left side of the street trying to pass behind the plaintiff who, on hearing
the car, became confused and reversed his direction. The charge to the
jury was equivalent to a directed verdict for the defendant. On appeal,
the court in reversing a judgment for the defendant, said:
"The blind and the halt may use the streets without being
2 52 N. H. 244 (1872).
27148 Mass. 487, 491, 20 N. E. 111, 2 L. R. A. 500 (1889).
Italics supplied.
127 Ore. 406, 257 Pac. 20 (1928) ; S. C. 135 Ore. 518, 295 Pac. 1096.
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guilty of negligence if, in so doing, they exercise that degree of
care which an ordinarily prudent person similiarly afflicteds0 would
exercise under the same circumstances. The true test to be applied to this case is: what would an ordinarily prudent person,
who was blind and of the age and experience of the plaintiff, do
to avoid injury upon hearing the sound of an approaching automobile when crossing the street?"
These illustrations, from the numerous cases in which contributory
fault of adults with physical disability has been determined, indicate that
the courts are not in accord as to the test to be employed. Some courts
hold the adult with physical disability to the same external standard of
conduct as required of normal persons. Others deal with the physically
defective as they do with young children by placing them in a class separate from normal persons. This method as it has been applied to children has been generally followed and approved. It is easily understood
by juries. The chief difficulty is to determine within what ages the rule
applies. But this difficulty does not exist with reference to the disabled
adult. The proof shows an essential factor is lacking. Whatever ground
exists for the rule as to children exists equally for adults with physical
disability. The frequent reversals31 of judgments in cases where juries
have found for physically defective persons on the issue of contributory
negligence, suggests that courts adhering too closely, to the objective
standard may ,be too far out of step with popular reaction. Doubtless
on the facts in some cases reversals are proper irrespective of the formula used. Nevertheless, there is room for the suspicion that the
divergence between the views of the court and jury is too great if the
courts are to reflect the mores -of the people.

TEE

INFIRm ADULT AS DEFENDANT

In the foregoing discussion, the decisions considered had reference

to contributory fault. The formula suggested, partly objective and
partly subjective, that an adult with physical disability should be judged
by what can reasonably be expected of an adult with such disability
seems correct as it relates to contributory fault. However, the question
arises whether society exacts a higher standard of conduct when the
act of the disabled adult endangers the interests of others. In other
words, should the same standard used for the physically defective adult

as a plaintiff be used when he is a defendant? Should negligence and
contributory negligence be determined by the same test?
The Restatement of Torts, Section 289, comment a (with reference
Italics supplied.
r.See Note, 41 L. R. A. (N.s.) 193.

s

198

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.24

to the subject in general, and not as to persons with physical disability)
says:
"The rules which determine the contributory negligence of a
plaintiff are, with the exception stated in §463, comment a, the
same as those which determine the negligence of the defendant."
Section 464, comment b, says .32
"The rule stated in Section 289 is important in determining
whether the plaintiff should recognize the existence of a risk to
which it would be contributory negligence to expose himself. As
to the allowance to be made for such physical in.feriorities as are
substantial and suspectible of reasonably certain proof, see comment g on Section 289."
These comments indicate the same standard for negligence of the adult
of physical inferiority whether he be plaintiff or defendant. In the
Tentative' Draft of the Restatement there is a special note"3 as to
children:
"Special Note: There are so few cases which involve the liability
of a child defendant that it has been necessary to state the standard of behavior required of a child as it is indicated by the analogy
of contributory negligence on the part of young children. There
may be some doubt as to whether it is correct to regard contributory negligence and negligence as sufficiently analogous to make
one a safe basis for statements in regard to the other. It may be
that children should not be required to conform to a particular
standard in order to relieve an admittedly negligent defendant
from liability to them. It does not necessarily follow that a child
should not be required to conform to a higher standard of behavior
where it is necessary for the protection of innocent members of
the public."
The question of applying different standards to children for negligence and contributory negligence has arisen in very few cases. There
is authority for using the same standard for both3 4 and apparently some
support for requiring a higher standard when the child is a defendant.,;
Whatever basis there is for requiring a higher standard for children
"R EsTATEmENT, ToRTs §463 comment a. refers to §464. The reference in
§464 to §289 comment g. probably is intended for §289, comment h. as to which
see note 13 supra.
"RETATEMENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft, Part IV) §167.
Charbonneau v. MacRury, 84 N. H. 501, 153 Ati. 457, 73 A. L. R. 1266
(1931). See 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1153-54; Briese v. McArtle, 146 Wis. 89, 130
N. W. 893, 35 L. R. A. (x.s.) 574 (1911).
"Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437 (1855); Roberts v. Ring, 143 Minn. 151, 173
N. W. 437 (1919) - Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REv. 40.
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as defendants than as plaintiffs might seem to -apply with more force to
adults with physical incapacity. The adult conscious of his physical
defect is assumed to have normal knowledge, intelligence and judgment.
He might be held to take the risk in entering upon certain activities that
his conduct as a defendant must equal that of normal men. For example, if a man is so color blind that he cannot distinguish traffic signals, or a man subject to epilepsy (a disease characterized by sudden
loss of consciousness) undertakes to drive in traffic, it might seem reasonable to hold that he should desist from such activity unless his conduct, externally measured, is that of normal persons.3 6 If his conduct
does come up to this standard, he is not negligent merely because of
his incapacity. 37 In such activities the conduct reasonably to be expected
of the man with a physical defect is the same as that exacted of the
normal person. A child may not have the knowledge and judgment to
appreciate the danger in such activities, while the adult with knowledge
of his incapacity should know better. However, in activities less dangerous, it would seem that the physically defective defendant's conduct
could not be expected to equal the normal man's conduct. Suppose a
blind man in walking on a sidewalk runs over a small child. Though
under the circumstances this might dearly be negligence in a person who
could see, yet the test should be what the reasonable blind man would
do.
With respect to normal persons it is generally assumed that the
standard of conduct for negligence is the same as for contributory negligence.38 There is authority for the same rule as to young children.
There is little authority on this point with respect to adults who are
handicapped by some physical incapicity. It seems reasonable, however, to apply the same standard to the physically disabled person
whether he is plaintiff or defendant. In any situation it is the conduct
that can reasonably be expected of a person with such defect under the
external circumstances of the case. In an undertaking which involves
great danger to others,-the adult with a physical defectacting reasonto Roberts v. Ring, 143 Minn. 151, 173 N. W. 437 (1919). In this case defendant, 77 years old and defective in sight and hearing drove an automobile over
a boy on a public street. The court held it was an error to charge the jury to
take into consideration the defendant's age or condition of sight or hearing in
determining his negligence. The court said: "Such infirmities to the extent that
they were proper to be considered at all, presented only a reason why defendant
should refrain from operating an automobile on a crowded street where care
was .required to avoid injuring other travelers. When one by his acts or omissions
causes injury to others, his negligence is to be judged on the standard of care

usually exercised by the ordinarily prudent normal man."
' Madison v. Berry (La. 1933) 145 So. 694.
'RESTATEmENT, TORTS §289, comment a.; BOHLEN, STUDIES

IN TORTS, p. 527.
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ably with reference to such defect will refrain from the activity or be
held liable for harm unless his conduct is that of the normal man. The
reasonableness in this instance is whether he should undertake certain
activities. If it is reasonable for an infirm adult to engage in an activity,
there is no requirement that his conduct and the normal man's should
be identical.

